Adapted from National Public Radio.
More than a week after the Westgate attack, President Uhuru Kenyatta has vowed to set up a
commission to look into lapses in intelligence and security. At least 67 people died in the four-day siege, which ended with dozens still unaccounted for.
Days
after the attack, a man who manages a clothing store in the Westgate
Mall sorts through damaged shoes, shirts and ties. He's visibly shaken
from his trip back into the place he escaped under gunfire. Much of the
damaged clothing is from bullet holes.
"These are all waste
now," he says. "Even it if it is small hole, it is waste." He says
there's no insurance for a terrorist attack, and some of the most
expensive suits and shoes are missing.
Other shop owners
reported Rolex watches, diamond jewelry and mobile phones looted,
allegedly by Kenyan soldiers during the fight against the terrorists.
The allegations have shaken people in Nairobi, who just a week ago were
hailing the soldiers as heroes.
"We wish to affirm that
government takes very seriously these allegations of looting," Interior
Minister Joseph Ole Lenku said at a press conference.
Lenku was
on the defensive, and not just about what his soldiers allegedly did
during those four days in the mall, but what they did not do. A leaked
intelligence report indicates that security chiefs and Cabinet ministers
were warned about Westgate as an al-Shabab target. They were even
warned of one likely mode of attack, where operatives "storm the
buildings with guns and grenades."
Lenku's response: "With regard to the issue of our information or our intelligence, that is our business."
Probably
the most sensitive questions still lingering in this shaken city are
about how the fight was waged. Why did it take the Kenyan army four days
to kill five militants? And what happened to the other five to 10
terrorists?
Kweya Obedi is the Nairobi county director of the
Red Cross. He was leading a team of volunteers who rushed in on the
afternoon of Sept. 21 to rescue people from where they hid inside shops.
Even by that point, he says, some hours after the initial assault, the
terrorists had been mostly pushed back by the special Israeli-trained
unit of the police called the Recce group, experienced in hostage
rescue.
"The police had better control of the situation," Obedi says.
But then a commander of the special unit was killed, reportedly by
friendly fire, and the special police were sent out to guard the
perimeter while the soldiers took over the operation. That, business
owners say, is when they believe the looting took place.
It's
still unclear why Kenya's poorly paid military took over the situation
while the special police were sent outside, but several people familiar
with the operation say that's when the pace of attack slowed. By 10:30
that night, the situation had gone from a full-court press on the gunmen
to a siege or standoff that would stretch on for another three days.
"When
the military came in there was no proper plan for takeover. That
allowed the terrorists to regroup," says George Musamali, a retired
officer who now runs a Kenyan security company.
Musamali
criticized the military for allowing terrorists to regroup and rearm. He
and others said the military declined to fight at night, which may have
allowed the terrorists to hunt and kill more people in their hiding
places.
Now, Kenya's president has declared a commission of
inquiry to investigate the security lapses, but Musamali says that in
Kenya, commissions are seen as ways to evade the problem.
"In Kenya we are used to these kind of inquiries," he says. "We never see the results."
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